

NARRATIVE

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INTRODUCTORY

The U. S. Naval Technical Mission in Europe (NavTecMISEu) was established on 26 December 1944 and activated on 20 January 1945. It was decommissioned, its mission completed, on 1 November 1945.

The mission of NavTecMISEu, as formally stated in the document under which NavTecMISEu was established, was:

"To exploit German science and technology for the benefit of the Navy Department technical Bureaus and the Coordinator of Research and Development."

In other words, NavTecMISEu was an instrument of the technical branches of the Navy Department. It was designed and built to search out and remove to the Navy Department - and as rapidly as possible - all available German scientific and technical information.

To implement this task, a total of 309 officers, 109 civilian technicians and 340 enlisted men were on duty with the Mission at one time or another. These figures, plus more than a hundred French and German civilians employed for various tasks, brought the total personnel strength of the Mission to almost 900. The largest number of Mission personnel on board at any one time was 579. This was on 31 July 1945.

In transmitting information to Washington, the highest priority was given to that which was applicable to the war against Japan. Information which required rapid transmission was forwarded either by dispatch or by Letter Report. However, the bulk of information collected by the Mission was reduced to detailed Technical Reports.

In the course of nine and one-half months of its lifetime, the Mission compiled some 240 Letter Reports and 550 Technical Reports. The account of how this mass of information was assembled is related in the following chapters.

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ORIGIN

The U. S. Naval Technical Mission in Europe was activated 20 January 1945, but the story of its creation begins with the summer of 1944.

That the U.S. Navy should exploit all the technical ramifications of the German Navy was a foregone conclusion. The Navy Department sent Captain (later Commodore) Henry A. Schade, U.S.N., to Europe in June 1944 to investigate the means of best doing this.

Captain Schade came to Europe as the Naval Member of the U.S. Army organization ALSOS. The ALSOS Mission had been formed 11 May 1944 for the purpose of investigating German scientific developments.

On the basis of experience and knowledge gained while a member of ALSOS throughout the summer and fall of 1944, Captain Schade made recommendations to the Navy Department which resulted in the formation of NavTechMisEu.

Captain Schade spent June and July 1944 in Europe. On 19 June he reported to SHAEF in London for additional duty with the Combined Intelligence Priorities Committee (forerunner of the Combined Intelligence Objectives Sub-Committee, known as CIOS). This organization comprised seven U.S. and seven British agencies, of which the U.S. Navy was one, under the joint Chiefs of Staff. Its purpose was to compile priority lists of German installations and personalities for exploitation, covering the entire field of German intelligence.

Captain Schade returned to Washington for a brief period in August 1944. He selected four officers to join him in the Naval Section of ALSOS, of which he was appointed Senior Naval Member on 13 August 1944.

ALSOS set up offices in the U.S. Navy Headquarters building, 9 Rue de Presbourg, Paris, in which building NavTechMisEu later was housed.

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During the fall of 1944 several additional officers were added to the Naval Section of ALSOS. Field work began on a limited scale, covering German installations in France and Belgium. (1) Four jeeps and two weapons carriers were obtained from Com12thFleet. Clerical work was done by two yeomen. An index of targets, more highly specialized than that of CIOS, was started.

Experience soon revealed that the Navy needed freer play in the exploitation of German intelligence than was possible under the restricted ALSOS directive. In a letter dated 30 June 1944, Captain Schade proposed to the Coordinator of Research and Development that Navy AL OS

"be responsible not only for the collection of 'scientific intelligence' under the original terms of the original ALSOS Mission, but also for the collection of 'technical intelligence' for the U.S. Navy on the continent." (2)

On 25 October 1944 a conference was held in London, attended by Admiral Stark, Vice-Admiral Glassford, Captain Shelley, Captain Schade, and others, at which the ALSOS Mission was discussed. Minutes of that meeting stated:

"The advantage of an independent Mission for the collection of scientific and technical intelligence on German activities to supplement those intelligence activities which are covered in routine systematic fashion on a combined basis with the British under the CIOS system, were agreed to by all present." (3)

On 11 November 1944 Captain Schade was recalled to Washington to discuss further plans. He found Navy Department officials alert to the rich possibilities of German exploitation, and eager to create adequate machinery for this exploitation.

Captain Schade, upon request, submitted detailed views on the subject in a Memorandum dated 27 November 1944. (4) This Memorandum stated in part:

"By technical intelligence is meant information on German material developments of direct interest to the technical Bureaus of the Navy Department including research, engineering, and processes involved in the German war effort..."

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- (1) See Appendix 27 for index of ALSOS Reports.
 - (2) See Appendix 1.
 - (3) See Appendix 3.
 - (4) See Appendix 5.

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"....ALSOS.... is primarily an Army activity in which the Navy was invited to participate....

"The objectives of the Mission (ALSOS) as set forth in its Army directive, comprehend only 'secret scientific developments' of the enemy....

"....Naval participation in the Mission (ALSOS) is recognized in the directive only to the extent that any Naval Personnel accredited to the Mission shall be classified as Naval Scientists and function as assistants to the civilian Scientific Chief of the Mission...

"In actual operation of the Mission (ALSOS) to date in France, Belgium and Holland, there has been considerable deviation from the basic directive. The Senior Naval Member has utilized the Mission, where possible, without actual authority to do so, as a means of covering all Naval needs for technical intelligence on the continent of Europe, including not only research but also weapons and devices and industrial developments and processes of special interest to the Navy....To perform these functions there were, as of 10 November, a total of 17 Naval officers assigned to the Senior Naval Member....

"Since the scope of Naval activity far exceeded the original intentions of the War Department it was possible for the Army administration of the Mission to furnish only a fraction of the required services to the Naval activity.

....Reports of target exploitations by Naval activities have been forwarded by the Senior Naval Member directly to the Coordinator of Research and Development, Navy Department. Although the civilian Scientific Chief of the Mission has maintained (quite properly under the Mission's Army directive) that all reports should be submitted for his scrutiny and approval and should be forwarded by him through War Department channels, this is obviously an unrealistic procedure in view of the existing circumstances and cannot satisfy Navy needs.

"To summarize, in order to get Navy business done, the Senior Naval Member has found it necessary to act without actual authority to do so as an independent Navy Mission utilizing whatever facilities, Army, Navy, ALSOS, civilian, could be obtained under the circumstances existing in the field. Although this has worked with reasonable satisfaction so far it is doubtful whether it can continue to work in view of growing naval needs for technical intelligence as the defeat of Germany approaches.

"The CIOS, formed by directive of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, operates to coordinate all technical intelligence activities in the European theatre for both

British and U.S. interests... As an advisory body to SHAEF, CIOS collects target information from any agency, requests SHAEF to secure or guard the targets where necessary and in some cases, it actually forms teams to exploit targets. Copies of all reports on technical intelligence in the European theater made by any U.S. or British agency are required to be furnished to CIOS which is then supposed to arrange for appropriate dissemination to agencies other than the originator of the report. The CIOS is essentially a London activity...

"The new TIIC (Technical Industrial Intelligence Committee)...is apparently a group which will operate in Washington to facilitate (and perhaps direct) the activities of representatives of U.S. industry in exploiting industrial intelligence targets in Germany.

"It becomes obvious that the growing interests of the Navy technical Bureaus in German technical intelligence cannot be handled under existing ALSOS arrangements alone. The Navy Department's interests in German science and technology are too vital and too comprehensive to permit them to be handled as a secondary adjunct to an Army intelligence activity, namely, the ALSOS Mission, to which the War Department itself entrusts only a small fraction of its analogous interests.

"It is therefore recommended that the Navy Department establish a Navy Technical Mission in Europe, to exploit German science and technology for the benefit of the Navy, using as a nucleus the Naval ALSOS group already established and in operation. This must be done quickly, if at all...Formation of such a Mission merely legalizes and recognizes activities which, in a smaller way, have already been conducted in the past without such recognition or authority and provides for an expansion to meet the growing interests of the Navy already evident among the technical Bureaus of the Navy Department..."

The Memorandum then proceeded to outline a proposed U.S. Naval Technical Mission in Europe, designed to meet the Navy's needs.

On 29 November 1944, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations submitted Captain Schade's proposal to the Secretary of the Navy who approved it on 4 December. On 23 December Captain Schade was appointed Commodore, to serve as Chief of NavTechEu. On 26 December, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations dispatched the letter formally establishing the U.S. Naval Technical Mission in Europe.

PRE-ACTIVATION PERIOD

The chief of Mission immediately set to work. He selected two supply officers who established a temporary office in Washington. He discussed with heads of Bureaus the question of their needs, and the personnel, both officer and civilian, which they would make available to the Mission. The Chief of Mission chose a number of officers from the various Bureaus to head up the corresponding Sections within the Mission, requesting that they report to Paris not later than 31 January 1945.

In a memorandum on organization dated 19 December 1944, the Chief of Mission estimated his future personnel needs as follows: (1)

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|-------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| Administrative | 9 officers | 27 enlisted men |
| Technical | 36 officers | |
| Specialists (transient) | 10 officers and | |
| | 25 civilians | |
| Total | 70 officers and | 27 enlisted men |
| | civilians | |

Of this number, 16 officers and 15 enlisted men were already on duty with ALSOS. The memorandum stated that it was "possible to foresee a total personnel of approximately 100 who may be in Europe in connection with the activities of the Mission."

For the purpose of recruiting qualified technicians from industry, the Chief of Mission drafted a letter which the Bureaus sent to firms working with them on naval contracts. (2) The letter outlined the purpose of the Mission and requested the firms to release some of their technical personnel to the Mission on a temporary basis. The response was quick and satisfying. The Mission ultimately had access to more technicians than it was able to use.

(1) See Appendix 8.

(2) See Appendix 7. Enclosure (A) to "Organization Memorandum" dated 16 December 1944.

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An Organization Memorandum, dated 16 December 1944, prepared by the Chief of Mission stated: (1)

".... In choosing additional personnel for the Missionthe desirability of some German language qualifications should be emphasized Technical qualifications should of course take precedence over language qualifications, but where they are combined in one individual, the best results will be obtained."

On 29 December 1944, the Director of Naval Intelligence announced, by memorandum, the establishment of Section Op-16-R in ONI, to serve as the "Navy Department representative of U.S. NavTechIsEu." (2)

(1) See Appendix 7.

(2) See Appendix 9.

PREPARATORY PERIOD

During the period from the Mission's activation on 20 January 1945 until the Allies began to drive wedges into Germany east of the Rhine in late March, the Mission prepared for full-scale operations. Administrative headquarters were established in Paris, where they remained during the life of the mission.

Sources of information on German intelligence fell roughly into four categories:

- (a) inspection on the spot;
- (b) interrogation of key personnel;
- (c) documents;
- (d) captured equipment.

Field trips to tap these sources were made in France, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg and Western Germany as targets became available. As many newly-arrived officers as possible were sent on these trips for the additional purpose of gaining field experience.

Additional officer personnel were added to the Mission's permanent staff, including interpreters and trained P/ inter-rogators, some of whom had been operating on the continent since D-Day, collecting naval intelligence in the field. They included officers from:

- (a) ComNavEu Forward Intelligence Unit;
- (b) Mobile Explosive Investigation Units;
- (c) Readiness Section, ComNavEu.

More vehicles were added to the motor fleet. Three airplanes, two C-47's and one JRF, were obtained.

To coordinate the activities of the various U.S. and British naval agencies in the field and to integrate these activities into the broader SHAEEF organization, Naval Target Sub-Division (NTS) under G-2 Shaef was organized at a series of

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conferences of interested parties. A NavTechIsEu officer was nominated U.S. deputy head of NTS. NTS controlled a 19-station field radio communications network.

Combined advanced field teams (CAFT) were organized. These teams were set up under CIOS, with personnel from member agencies including NavTechIsEu officers and technicians, for the purpose of quickly assessing, on the spot, targets on the CIOS target list. These teams' assessment reports were to be sent back to member agencies as guides for the detailed exploitation of the targets. CAFT teams were designed and organized to meet the contingency of a German military collapse, with the resultant sudden opening up of the entire German field of intelligence.

FULL-SCALE OPERATIONS (1)

By late February and early March 1945 several of the major German cities west of the Rhine were captured and opened for intelligence exploitation. In early March the first bridgehead was established on the east bank of the Rhine at Remagen. Within a month, American and British forces were driving deep into Germany, freeing large areas for exploitation.

CAPT and Mission teams which had been standing by, or were already in the field, fanned out behind the advancing armies.

To facilitate the far-flung activities of the investigators three forward headquarters were established:

- (a) Bad Schwalbach (vicinity of Wiesbaden), in mid-April;
- (b) Heidelberg, in late April;
- (c) Bremen, in late May;
- (d) Munich, in mid-July.

Working parties from the Mission's Supply Section went into the field to crate captured enemy equipment and ship it back to the United States. Documents were studied on the spot, and/or sent to Paris or London for more detailed examination. German individuals, leaders in their respective fields, were interrogated in their offices and laboratories, and/or sent to the U.K. or to Paris for detailed interrogation.

In late May, NavTecMisEu shifted its personnel from CAPT teams to Mission teams for the reason that the need for detailed exploitation of targets had succeeded that of quick assessment.

The Armistice with Germany on 9 May opened new sources of information and generally facilitated the Mission's operations, but it occasioned no major changes in field investigation routine.

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The Mission reached the peak of its activity during the months of May through August. From September on, fewer officers were in the field, the majority being in Paris writing their reports.

DECOMMISSIONING (1) (2)

Eventually the flow of German intelligence through the Mission was reduced to the point where maintenance of a special organization such as the Mission was no longer necessary. However, the flow of technical intelligence did not cease altogether. Furthermore, the Mission was engaged in a number of projects some of which would carry over into 1946.

These projects, pursued jointly with other U.S. or British agencies, were:

- (a) Torpedo tests and Walter torpedo procurement, at Kiel.
- (b) Shipment to U.S. of heavy armor for ballistic tests, from Weppen;
- (c) Hydrogen peroxide supply program;
- (d) Manufacture and tests of He-Oll engines, at Munich.

The Chief of Mission and the Head of the Technical Branch of the Mission discussed with the Chief of Naval Operations the question of transfer of supervision of this work from the Mission to another agency, at a conference in Washington on 27 September 1945. Upon his return to Europe, the Chief of Mission conferred with Commander, Naval Forces in Europe; Commander, Naval Forces in Germany, and the Naval Advisor to the Office of Military Government of Germany (U.S.).

On 1 October 1945, the Chief of Naval Operations dispatched a letter authorizing the Chief of Mission to decommission NavTecMisEu "on or about 1 November 1945", and setting out directions for decommissioning. In compliance with this letter, a group of 11 officers was attached to the Naval Advisor to the Office of Military Government of Germany (U.S.) in Berlin, to terminate the Mission's pending projects. The group was known as the U.S. Naval Technical Unit in Europe.

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- (1) See Appendix 22.
 - (2) See Appendix 24.

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Its mission completed, NavTecMisEu was decommissioned 1
November 1945.